The OT Blind Spot: What CMMC Requires for the Shop Floor
Youβve rolled out MFA on every account, put EDR on every laptop, and gotten your patch schedule running like clockwork. Your IT security is ready for CMMC.
Then you walk onto the shop floor, and suddenly itβs a different story. Your CNC controller canβt run an endpoint agent, canβt prompt for MFA, and hasnβt seen a software update since the day it was installed last decade. But itβs handling CUI all the same, and that means CMMC wants to know about it.
In the first post of our OT security series, we looked at why OT security doesnβt always overlap with IT security. Shop floor equipment runs on different priorities and timelines, and IT best practices can cause real trouble when theyβre applied to it as blanket rules.
Today, weβre looking at another important OT question for any company working toward CMMC Level 2: If you canβt secure your shop machines the same way you secure your laptops, what does CMMC expect you to do with them?
The good news is that CMMC neither ignores OT nor expects a 20-year-old lathe to meet the same cybersecurity standards as a brand-new laptop. Instead, it has a scoping category built for exactly this situation: specialized assets.
In this post, weβll cover where OT fits in CMMC, what the specialized assets category includes, and how to document and protect those assets so they hold up when you reach assessment time.
Why OT Gets Treated Differently in CMMC
Every CMMC Level 2 assessment starts with scoping: identifying which assets will process, store, or transmit CUI and must therefore meet the applicable NIST SP 800-171 requirements.
But the CMMC scoping guidance in 32 CFR Β§ 170.19 also recognizes that some OT equipment handles CUI without being able to meet those NIST requirements, no matter how hard you try. On a typical defense manufacturing floor, that might include:
- CNC machines and their controllers
- PLCs that run production lines and processes
- HMIs used by operators to monitor and control equipment
- 3D printers and other additive manufacturing systems
- And many other devices
There are lots of reasons why OT equipment canβt be secured in the same way as your other CMMC assets. Shop floor equipment often stays in service for decades, for example, so it commonly runs software thatβs long past its vendor support date. Other OT devices may lack the processing power to run an EDR agent or antivirus. Still others are in charge of production processes that canβt afford to be taken offline by common IT controls like account lockouts or forced reboots.
Specialized Assets: In Scope, but Handled Differently
None of this takes OT out of CMMCβs view, though; it just changes how CMMC handles it. If your OT equipment touches CUI, it still has to be accounted for.
Thatβs where the specialized asset category comes in. A specialized asset is a system that can process, store, or transmit CUI but canβt be fully secured using conventional IT controls.
The scoping guidance breaks out specialized assets into five main types: Internet of Things (IoT) and Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) devices, Operational Technology (OT), Government Furnished Equipment (GFE), Restricted Information Systems, and Test Equipment. For most manufacturers, OT is the main type theyβll have on their shop floor, including industrial control systems (ICS) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems.
During a CMMC Level 2 assessment, specialized assets arenβt assessed against the NIST SP 800-171 requirements the way other CUI assets are. Theyβre still in scope, though, and the scoping guidance requires you to:
- List them in your asset inventory
- Address them in your System Security Plan (SSP)
- Show them on your network diagram
- Manage them using your companyβs risk-based security policies, procedures, and practices
That last requirement is where compensating controls, a key part of OT security, enter the scene.
Compensating Controls: Protecting What You Canβt Lock Down
Weβve already established that you canβt put MFA on a CNC controller or install EDR on a PLC from 2004, but you still need to protect them. The solution is to control everything around your specialized assets: who can reach them, what they connect to, and how data moves on and off of them.
In other words, when you canβt harden the asset itself, you harden its surroundings. The right compensating controls depend on the asset and the environment, but they might include:
- Network segmentation that isolates OT from the rest of the CUI environment and from the internet
- Physical access restrictions on the shop floor and at controller interfaces
- Boundary-level logging and passive network monitoring where endpoint agents canβt be installed
- Clear, documented methods for moving design files from engineering workstations to machines without exposing them to the internet or the cloud
- Managed, monitored remote access for equipment vendors
- Periodic manual checks to confirm the asset hasnβt drifted from its documented configuration
Measures like these cover the security side of the equation, keeping your OT protected even when the equipment itself canβt be hardened.
Under CMMC, though, you also have to document what youβre doing. For your assessment, youβll need a written justification for each specialized asset explaining why it canβt meet the standard controls and which compensating controls are protecting it instead. Youβll also need to back that up with evidence such as network diagrams, configuration screenshots, and signed employee agreements, and youβll need to keep all your documentation current as new machines arrive or vendors update configurations.
One more important note: Specialized assets in CMMC are often confused with contractor risk managed assets (CRMAs) or out-of-scope assets. Hereβs how to keep them straight:
CRMAs are assets that could technically process, store, or transmit CUI but are kept from doing so by technical safeguards or company policies. In a manufacturing environment, that might be a production scheduling workstation on the plant network, or a machine that only ever runs commercial parts but sits on the same network segment as equipment that handles CUI. CRMAs donβt have to be physically or logically separated from the CUI environment, but they do have to be documented in your asset inventory, SSP, and network diagram.
Out-of-scope assets donβt process, store, or transmit CUI. Think of an isolated machine that only produces commercial orders, or a break room TV on the WiFi network. These assets fall outside the CMMC assessment entirely.
Your specialized assets do handle CUI, which is why they get included in your inventory and your SSP. Misclassifying these assets as CRMAs or out-of-scope assets or leaving them out of your documentation is an easy way to stumble in a CMMC assessment, even if youβre doing a great job of securing your equipment on the shop floor.
Closing the Blind Spot
Itβs easy to treat shop floor equipment as an unlikely attack surface and a compliance headache to be checked off the list as soon as possible. But the machines that turn CUI drawings into finished parts are some of the most valuable systems a defense manufacturer has, and adversaries know it. Securing your OT protects more than your CMMC status: it protects your production schedule, your customersβ programs, and the warfighters who depend on what you build.
Getting it right starts with knowing whatβs on your shop floor, which of those systems touch CUI, and how each one should be classified. From there, itβs a matter of protecting your specialized assets through compensating controls and documenting your approach carefully so that it holds up at assessment time.
Of course, like many things with CMMC, itβs easier said than done. In the final post of this series, weβll look at practical steps for securing OT in the DIB and some of the real obstacles that defense manufacturers run into along the way.